Inclusion list economics
There are greedy (G) and non-greedy (NG) proposers, as well as censoring and non-censoring builders. Suppose there is a fraction
of G-proposers, and
NG-proposers. A fraction
of G-proposers is also censoring (GC-proposer), while
doesn’t censor (GNC-proposers). All NG-proposers are non-censoring.
So there is a fraction
of censoring proposers, and
of non-censoring proposers.
The best builder is censoring (”censoring-best”), so NG-proposers choose a second-best, non-censoring builder, while G-proposers choose the censoring-best builder. The censoring-best builder pays
while the non-censoring builders pay
,
.
Whenever a censoring proposer is faced with an IL they do not wish to satisfy, they either not propose a block and receive
, or propose an artificially full block of value
, where
is the cost to fill the block, whichever is higher.
Whenever a greedy non-censoring proposer is faced with an IL, they either pick the non-censoring builder block for value
or the artificially full block
, whichever is higher value.
- When NG-proposers make the IL for themselves, they receive while G-proposers receive
- When NC-proposers make the IL for “the next proposer” (or some other proposer), that proposer is drawn from the distribution of NG-, GC- and GNC-proposers The possible outcomes are:
- C-proposer making the list for NG-proposer ⇒ , with probability
- C-proposer making the list for GNC-proposer ⇒ , with probability
- C-proposer making the list for GC-proposer ⇒ , with probability
- NC-proposer making the list for NG-proposer ⇒ , with probability
- NC-proposer making the list for GNC-proposer ⇒ , with probability
- NC-proposer making the list for GC-proposer ⇒ , with probability
- Payoff for NG-proposer ⇒
- Payoff for GNC-proposer ⇒
- Payoff for GC ⇒
The expected payoffs to the IL-bound proposer are: